By Iroyin Yoruba Television
Nigeria has renewed its commitment to strengthening the systems used to prevent, detect and respond to infectious disease outbreaks, with the Federal Government highlighting expanded disease surveillance, laboratory capacity, emergency coordination and genomic sequencing as key components of the country's preparedness for future pandemics.
The renewed commitment was presented on September 26, 2026, during a high-level United Nations meeting on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response in New York. Nigeria's Minister of State for Health and Social Welfare, Dr Iziaq Adekunle Salako, said the country was seeking a health-security system capable of identifying threats early and responding rapidly before outbreaks develop into larger emergencies.
The announcement comes more than six years after COVID-19 exposed weaknesses in health systems around the world and demonstrated how quickly an infectious disease can disrupt healthcare, education, transportation, trade and household incomes.
Nigeria's latest position places greater emphasis on preparedness between emergencies rather than waiting for an outbreak before building response capacity.
PREPAREDNESS BEFORE THE NEXT OUTBREAK
The Federal Government says Nigeria's approach is based on the principle that strong everyday public-health systems are the foundation of effective emergency response.
That means disease surveillance should operate continuously, laboratories should be able to test suspected infections, health workers should understand infection-prevention procedures, emergency coordination centres should remain functional and authorities should have mechanisms for rapidly communicating credible information to communities.
The Ministry of Health said Nigeria has strengthened its legal and institutional arrangements, expanded nationwide digital surveillance, introduced the 7-1-7 approach, increased genomic sequencing capacity and improved its ability to prepare for multiple types of hazards.
The 7-1-7 approach is designed around three response milestones: detecting a suspected public-health threat within seven days, notifying the relevant authorities within one day and beginning an appropriate response within seven days.
The purpose is to reduce the time between the appearance of a health threat and the beginning of organised action.
Speed is particularly important for diseases that can spread rapidly.
A delay of several days may allow an infectious disease to move from a single case into a cluster, from a cluster into multiple communities and potentially across state or national borders.
LABORATORY CAPACITY HAS EXPANDED
Laboratories are among the most important components of outbreak preparedness because public-health authorities need reliable testing to distinguish between suspected and confirmed cases.
According to the Federal Ministry of Health, Nigeria's public-health laboratory network now covers all 36 states.
The expansion represents an important change from the situation during the early stages of COVID-19, when Nigeria had a much smaller number of laboratories capable of conducting specialised testing.
The ministry previously reported that PCR testing capacity had expanded from five laboratories to 129 laboratories, alongside seven genomic sequencing laboratories. It also reported that the SORMAS digital surveillance platform had been deployed across all 36 states, with 96 per cent of local government areas connected for real-time reporting.
These improvements are important because laboratory confirmation can influence decisions about isolation, treatment, contact tracing, vaccination campaigns and other public-health interventions.
Without reliable laboratory information, authorities may have difficulty determining whether a cluster is caused by a known disease, a new pathogen or another condition with similar symptoms.
WHY GENOMIC SEQUENCING MATTERS
Nigeria's expansion of genomic sequencing capacity is another part of the country's preparedness strategy.
Genomic sequencing can help scientists examine the genetic characteristics of viruses and other pathogens.
During an outbreak, sequencing may help identify whether cases are linked, determine whether a pathogen has changed and provide information about how an infection is spreading.
It can also contribute to international surveillance when countries share relevant information through established public-health networks.
The technology does not replace conventional laboratory testing. Instead, it provides another layer of information that can become particularly valuable when health authorities are dealing with unusual outbreaks or emerging variants.
Building sequencing capacity within Nigeria can also reduce dependence on sending every specialised sample abroad, potentially allowing scientists and authorities to obtain important information more quickly.
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTRES
The Federal Government also highlighted Public Health Emergency Operations Centres as part of the country's response infrastructure.
These centres are designed to bring together different parts of the health system during an outbreak or other emergency.
Instead of agencies working independently, emergency coordination allows surveillance teams, laboratories, epidemiologists, clinicians, communications specialists, logistics officers and government authorities to work from a common response structure.
Nigeria's health authorities said Public Health Emergency Operations Centres support coordinated responses to outbreaks including Lassa fever, cholera, diphtheria and meningitis.
The importance of these structures becomes particularly clear during outbreaks that affect several states simultaneously.
An outbreak may require medical supplies in one location, laboratory testing in another, vaccination activities elsewhere and public information campaigns across a much wider area.
Without coordination, resources can be delayed or duplicated.
RECENT DISEASE THREATS SHOW WHY READINESS MATTERS
Nigeria's emphasis on preparedness comes as the country continues to deal with infectious diseases that can place pressure on the health system.
In August 2026, the Federal Government activated an emergency task force following a diphtheria outbreak affecting parts of Katsina and Kano States.
The response involved federal health authorities, the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Primary Health Care Development Agency, affected state governments and international health partners. Measures included strengthening surveillance, addressing immunisation gaps and improving access to treatment.
Earlier in the year, the government also intensified preparedness measures in response to Ebola concerns in parts of Africa.
Nigeria reported that it had no confirmed Ebola case while strengthening surveillance, screening at points of entry, laboratory preparedness, infection-prevention procedures and emergency response arrangements.
These examples demonstrate that pandemic preparedness is not limited to a single disease.
A country can simultaneously face established infectious diseases, emerging pathogens and imported health threats.
BORDER HEALTH REMAINS IMPORTANT
Nigeria's position as a major regional travel and commercial hub means that points of entry remain an important part of disease surveillance.
International airports, seaports and land borders can become critical locations for identifying travellers who may require further assessment.
During its Ebola preparedness measures, the Federal Ministry of Health described enhanced screening, health declarations, travel-history assessments and secondary screening for travellers showing symptoms consistent with viral haemorrhagic fever.
The purpose of such measures is not to prevent ordinary international travel.
Instead, border health systems provide an additional opportunity to identify potential threats before they spread into wider communities.
Effective border surveillance also depends on communication between health authorities, immigration officials, aviation authorities, maritime agencies and other organisations operating at points of entry.
THE ONE HEALTH APPROACH
Nigeria is also placing greater emphasis on the One Health approach.
One Health recognises that human health is connected to animal health and the environment.
Some infectious diseases that affect humans originate in animals before crossing into human populations. Changes in land use, agricultural practices, wildlife contact, climate conditions and human settlement patterns can influence the risk of disease transmission.
This means that preventing future outbreaks may require information from veterinarians, environmental specialists, agricultural authorities and public-health professionals.
The Federal Government said Nigeria is advancing implementation of One Health alongside antimicrobial-resistance governance, infection-prevention programmes and emergency workforce development.
The approach is particularly relevant to diseases that can move between animals and humans.
ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE ADDS ANOTHER RISK
Pandemic preparedness is not limited to viruses.
Nigeria has also identified antimicrobial resistance as a continuing public-health threat.
Antimicrobial resistance occurs when bacteria, viruses, fungi or parasites become less responsive to medicines designed to treat them.
When medicines become less effective, infections can become harder to treat, increasing the possibility of prolonged illness, hospitalisation and death.
Resistance can also complicate responses to outbreaks because health workers may have fewer effective treatment options.
Nigeria has therefore argued that antimicrobial resistance should remain part of the global pandemic-preparedness agenda.
The country is scheduled to host the fifth Global High-Level Ministerial Conference on Antimicrobial Resistance in December 2026, which the Federal Government says will be the first time the meeting is held in Africa.
The conference is expected to provide an opportunity for governments and health-sector stakeholders to discuss measures for reducing antimicrobial resistance and strengthening One Health action.
FINANCING REMAINS A CENTRAL CHALLENGE
Building preparedness systems requires sustained funding.
Laboratories require equipment, maintenance and trained personnel. Surveillance systems require technology and reliable connectivity. Emergency operations centres need staff and communication infrastructure. Health workers need training and protective equipment.
These expenses do not disappear when an outbreak ends.
In fact, maintaining readiness between emergencies is one of the most difficult parts of public-health preparedness.
Nigeria said a US$250 million World Bank Health Security Programme is supporting health-security capacity at federal and state levels under a One Health approach.
The Federal Government has also called for sustainable financing mechanisms for low- and middle-income countries.
At the international level, the World Health Organization has similarly highlighted the need for sustained investment in pandemic-prevention and preparedness capabilities, particularly in countries where financing gaps remain significant.
The issue is important because emergency funding often becomes available after an outbreak has already started.
Preparedness requires money to be spent before the crisis, when there may be no immediate political or public pressure to do so.
THE COMMUNITY IS PART OF THE RESPONSE
Government laboratories and emergency centres cannot contain outbreaks by themselves.
Communities are often the first place where unusual illness is noticed.
Families may identify a cluster of unexplained symptoms before health authorities receive a formal report. Community leaders, traditional institutions, religious organisations, schools and local health workers can therefore contribute to early detection.
Nigeria has stressed the importance of risk communication and community engagement as part of preparedness.
The Federal Government said public trust cannot be built only after an emergency begins and called for sustained investment in social listening, community hygiene and management of misinformation between emergencies.
This is particularly important in an era when rumours can spread through social media within minutes.
False information can encourage people to reject treatment, ignore official instructions or adopt unsafe practices.
Clear communication before an emergency can make it easier for authorities to communicate with communities when a genuine crisis occurs.
THE LESSONS FROM COVID-19
The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated that an infectious disease can quickly become more than a health emergency.
Schools were closed, businesses were disrupted, hospitals were placed under pressure and governments had to make decisions with incomplete information.
The pandemic also exposed differences in access to vaccines, diagnostic tools, protective equipment and medical supplies between countries.
Nigeria's current preparedness strategy reflects some of those lessons.
The emphasis on domestic capacity, laboratory networks, surveillance, genomic sequencing, emergency coordination and community engagement is intended to reduce dependence on emergency arrangements created only after a crisis has begun.
The Federal Government has also called for stronger African manufacturing capacity and more equitable access to vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics.
PREPAREDNESS MUST REACH THE STATES
National policies ultimately have to work at state and local levels.
Nigeria's 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory have different population sizes, health infrastructure, geographic conditions and disease risks.
A preparedness system that works only in Abuja or major cities cannot adequately protect communities in remote areas.
This makes the expansion of laboratory networks and digital surveillance particularly important.
The health system also needs trained personnel who can recognise unusual disease patterns, report them through established channels and begin appropriate response activities.
Strengthening state and local capacity can shorten the distance between the appearance of an outbreak and the arrival of an organised response.
THE NEXT TEST WILL BE IMPLEMENTATION
Nigeria's renewed commitment provides a framework, but preparedness will ultimately be measured by how effectively these systems function during real emergencies.
A laboratory network must be able to deliver timely and accurate results.
Surveillance platforms must receive reliable information.
Emergency centres must be able to coordinate quickly.
Health workers must have the equipment and training required to protect themselves and patients.
Communities must receive clear information.
And funding must remain available even when there is no major outbreak dominating public attention.
The World Health Organization has similarly stressed that progress made since COVID-19 needs to be translated into sustained capabilities, financing and collective action rather than remaining only at the level of international commitments.
A LONG-TERM HEALTH SECURITY PRIORITY
Nigeria's latest position signals a shift towards treating pandemic preparedness as a permanent component of national health planning rather than an emergency activity activated only when a dangerous outbreak appears.
The country's reported expansion of laboratory capacity, digital surveillance, genomic sequencing and emergency coordination provides a stronger foundation than existed before the COVID-19 pandemic.
However, maintaining those systems will require continuous investment, trained personnel, reliable infrastructure and effective cooperation between federal, state and local authorities.
The country's emphasis on One Health also recognises that future health threats may emerge from interactions between humans, animals and the environment.
Meanwhile, antimicrobial resistance, established diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria, and emerging infectious threats all require sustained attention.
For Nigerians, effective pandemic preparedness ultimately means having confidence that an unusual disease will be detected early, investigated quickly and met with an organised response.
The objective is not to predict the next pandemic.
It is to ensure that when the next serious public-health threat appears—whether it is a familiar disease spreading in an unexpected way or a completely new pathogen—the systems needed to protect lives are already operating.
Nigeria's latest commitment therefore places the emphasis on preparation before crisis, stronger national capacity and closer cooperation with other countries.
The effectiveness of that approach will depend on whether the commitments announced in international meetings continue to translate into functioning laboratories, responsive surveillance systems, trained health workers, adequate financing and trusted public-health institutions across the country.h